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Multinational Firms
Reconciling Theory and Evidence
James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskus
3.1 Introduction
An important component of Robert Lipsey’s research has involved the
study of direct foreign investment and often the relationship between in-
vestment and trade. From our point of view, this research is of major im-
portance, and our ﬁrst task in this paper is to explain why.
The ﬁeld of international trade developed in the modern era, largely as
a study of trade in goods. Mundell (1957) wrote an important article in
which he noted that trade in goods and trade in factors were substitutes,
perhaps suggesting that there is little point in expanding our theory to in-
clude trade in factors: The same equilibrium in terms of commodity prices,
factor prices, and welfare can be achieved by trading either goods or fac-
tors. Only much later was it noted that Mundell had shown this in the con-
text of an extremely special case, namely a 2  2 Heckscher-Ohlin model
with zero trade costs in both goods and factors. Positive analyses showed
a wide variety of circumstances in which trade in goods and factors are
complements (Markusen 1983; Wong 1986; Markusen and Svensson 1985;
Ethier and Svensson 1986; Neary 1995). Normative analyses showed that
the eﬀects of policy often depend crucially on what is traded (Brecher and
Diaz-Alejandro 1977; Bhagwati and Brecher 1980; Dick 1993).
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71Although it had many antecedents (e.g., Kemp 1969; Melvin 1969;
Linder 1961), an industrial-organization (IO) approach to trade was devel-
oped in the 1980s. This approach incorporated elements of imperfect com-
petition, increasing returns to scale, and product diﬀerentiation into gen-
eral equilibrium trade models. Yet this new theory, however welcome, was
largely disjoint from the study of multinational enterprises. Firms in the
trade-IO literature are typically single-plant production units with all ﬁrm
activities in a single location. This is rather odd insofar as most of the
ﬁrms that ﬁt the general facts and paradigms of the IO approach to trade
are indeed multinationals with production plants in several countries. Re-
search on multinationals was certainly produced, but it was often (at best)
partial equilibrium in nature and focused on individual ﬁrms rather than
on explaining the pattern of direct investment in relation to country and
industry characteristics.
Robert Lipsey is a distinctive individual in that he apparently ignored
this allocation of trade, national ﬁrms, and general equilibrium to trade
theory, and of multinational ﬁrms to the international business studies.
Lipsey wrote a number of important articles in which he related the pat-
tern of direct investment by multinational ﬁrms to national characteristics
and to trade ﬂows. This work presented researchers with a comprehensive
and challenging set of stylized facts to explain. His research helped make
it clear that multinationals had to be integrated into both trade theory and
the empirical analysis of trade and investment ﬂows.
The work by Lipsey that most clearly relates to this paper includes the
following. Two early papers with Merle Yahr Weiss examined determi-
nants of foreign production and exports (Lipsey and Weiss 1981, 1984).
During the same period Lipsey developed a long coauthorship with Irv-
ing Kravis, looking at the determinants of the competitiveness of multi-
national ﬁrms and how these ﬁrms aﬀect other variables of interest, such
as domestic employment (Kravis and Lipsey 1982, 1988, 1992; Lipsey and
Kravis 1987). Single-authored papers on determinants of inward and out-
ward investment and the internationalization of production include Lip-
sey (1988, 1989, 1993, 1995). A series of other papers was the result of col-
laboration with Magnus Blomstro ¨m (Blomstro ¨m and Lipsey 1989, 1993),
in some cases with other coauthors (Blomstro ¨m, Kravis, and Lipsey 1988;
Blomstro ¨m, Lipsey, and Kulchycky 1988; Blomstro ¨m, Lipsey, and Ohlsson
1990; Lipsey, Blomstro ¨m, and Ramstetter 1998). This body of work pro-
vides a tremendous volume of empirical evidence on direct investment and
trade, which needs to be reconciled with formal theory.
A few attempts to develop a formal general-equilibrium theory of multi-
national ﬁrms developed during the early 1980s. Helpman (1984) had a
model in which production involved two activities—one capital intensive
and one labor intensive—that could be geographically separated. Marku-
sen (1984) took a rather diﬀerent approach, assuming the existence of
ﬁrm-level (as opposed to plant-level) scale economies arising from the
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production facilities. Helpman’s model captured the notion of vertically
integrated ﬁrms, but allowed no investments to take place between very
similar countries, which is clearly counter to empirical fact. Markusen’s
model captured the notion of horizontally integrated ﬁrms that undertake
the same activity in multiple countries, but excluded any motive for verti-
cal specialization. Theoretical reﬁnements of these ideas can be found in
Helpman (1985), Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 1992), Brainard
(1993a), Markusen (1997), and Markusen and Venables (1998); a survey
is found in Markusen (1995).
During the same period in which some of this formal theory was devel-
oping, a large body of empirical work developed relating direct investment
to country and industry characteristics, much of this by Robert Lipsey
alone or with various coauthors as just noted. It quickly became clear
that the overwhelming proportion of direct investment occurs among the
similar, high-income developed countries, not among dissimilar countries.
“North-north” investment dominates “north-south” investment even after
correcting for income levels and other determinants. At a superﬁcial level,
horizontal, multiplant models ﬁt the data better than do vertical special-
ization models, which do not predict direct investment among similar
countries.
Formal econometric reconciliation or testing of the theories with the
evidence was slow in coming. Two important papers by Brainard (1993b,
1997) conﬁrmed the casual observation that similarities rather than
diﬀerences between countries in terms of size and relative endowments are
closely related to the level of direct investment relative to trade. These
papers provide additional support to the horizontal view that ﬁrm-level
scale economies rather than factor intensity diﬀerences between activities
provide the more important explanation of direct investment. Yet subse-
quent to 1987, the year of Brainard’s data sample, a boom in direct invest-
ment to developing countries emerged. This suggested that perhaps it was
unmeasured investment barriers that accounted for the low levels of direct
investment to these countries. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (forthcoming)
estimate a model that integrates both horizontal and vertical motives for
direct investment on 1986–94 panel data and ﬁnd support for that inte-
grated approach. Complementary work by Ekholm (1995, 1997, 1998a,
1998b) supports the ﬁndings of Brainard and of Carr, Markusen, and
Maskus, and adds convincing evidence about the importance of intraﬁrm
trade in knowledge-intensive headquarters services. Of relevance to the
present study, recent empirical work that focuses on the relationships be-
tween direct investment and trade ﬂows (particularly intraﬁrm), such as
whether trade and investment are in some sense complements or substi-
tutes, includes papers by Blonigen (1997, 1998), Swenson (1998), and
Smith (1998).
The objective of this paper is to extend this inquiry by decomposing
Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence 73foreign aﬃliate production data into sales to the host-country market and
export sales. We ﬁrst develop and extend existing theory from Markusen
(1997) and Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (forthcoming) to generate sepa-
rate predictions of how local sales versus export sales should be related to
parent-country and host-country characteristics. This approach will at-
tempt to get at the horizontal versus vertical distinction that is not explic-
itly considered in Carr et al. (forthcoming). These theoretical predictions
are then taken to the data.
Results ﬁt well with the theoretical hypotheses. Local sales of foreign
aﬃliates are strongly dependent on market size and trade costs into the
host country. The diﬀerence in skilled labor abundance between the parent
and host country is only weakly related to local aﬃliate sales in both eco-
nomic and statistical terms. Export sales are weakly related to market size
and to host-country trade costs. They are strongly related to the skilled
labor endowment diﬀerences of the parent and host countries, and strongly
related to an interaction term between skill diﬀerences and country size:
Exports by aﬃliates are particularly important when the parent is both
small and skilled-labor-abundant (e.g., Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land). Both local sales and export sales are strongly negatively related to a
host-country investment barrier (cost) index.
The ratio of exports to local sales is positively related to the relative
skilled labor abundance of the parent, and negatively related to market
size, the host-country investment cost index, and the host-country trade
cost index. The ﬁndings on trade and investment costs may be due to a
substitution phenomenon. If the investment is undertaken to serve the lo-
cal market, ﬁrms will bear the trade and investment costs. If the investment
is made to serve the market in the parent or third countries, high local
trade and investment costs will induce the ﬁrm to look elsewhere.
3.2 The Knowledge-Capital Model
In this section, we outline what we refer to as the knowledge-capital
model of the multinational enterprise. A formal algebraic development is
presented in Markusen (1997), and many of its testable implications are
analyzed in Carr et al. (forthcoming).
Assume a two-good, two-factor, two-country world. Refer to the factors
as skilled (S) and unskilled (L) labor. Good Y is produced with constant
returns to scale by a competitive industry and is unskilled labor intensive.
The countries are referred to as h (home) and f (foreign).
Good X is produced with increasing returns by imperfectly competitive,
Cournot ﬁrms. Production of X requires a ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost—head-
quarters services such as R&D, management, ﬁnance, accounting, market-
ing and so forth. An X ﬁrm may then have one or two plants, and a plant
and headquarters may be geographically separated. Headquarters services
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referred to in the literature as multiplant economies of scale. The idea is
that headquarters services (e.g., blueprints) are often knowledge based and
can be provided to additional production facilities at low or zero marginal
cost. We also assume plant-level ﬁxed costs (scale economies).
Assumptions about the factor intensities of ﬁxed costs are crucial to the
story. We assume that headquarters services use skilled labor exclusively.
Plant-level ﬁxed costs are a combination of skilled and unskilled labor.
Final production occurs with constant costs and requires only unskilled
labor. Transport costs between markets use unskilled labor. Finally, we
assume that plant production, including both ﬁxed costs and marginal
costs, is more skilled labor intensive than Y production, the composite of
the rest of the economy. This is not particularly important to any of the
results in this paper, but is important in generating certain results concern-
ing the factor price eﬀects of investment liberalization (Markusen 1997).
In summary, then, the ranking of activities from most skilled labor inten-
sive to least skilled labor intensive is as follows:
[headquarters only]  >  [integrated X]  >  [plant only]  >  [Y].
This completes the description of the model, and allows us to specify
more precisely what is meant by the knowledge-capital approach. There
are three deﬁning assumptions:
1. Transportability or fragmentation. The services of knowledge-based
assets may be fragmented from production and are easily supplied to geo-
graphically separate production facilities.
2. Skilled labor intensity. Knowledge-based assets are skilled labor in-
tensive relative to ﬁnal production.
3. Jointness. The services of knowledge-based assets are (at least par-
tially) joint (public) inputs into geographically separate production facil-
ities.
The ﬁrst two properties give rise to vertical multinationals that locate
their single plant and headquarters in diﬀerent countries depending on
factor prices and market sizes. The third property gives rise to horizontal
multinationals that have plants producing the ﬁnal goods in multiple coun-
tries.
More formally, several types of ﬁrms may be active in equilibrium in a
free-entry Cournot equilibrium for the model we have just outlined. The
term national ﬁrms refers to single-plant ﬁrms with their headquarters and
plant in the same country; the term horizontal multinationals refers to two-
plant ﬁrms with their headquarters in one country or the other. Vertical
multinationals refers to single-plant ﬁrms with their headquarters and
plant in diﬀerent countries.
Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence 75Here we simply outline the results that emerge from this model with
respect to what types of ﬁrms are active in equilibrium as a function of
country characteristics, such as diﬀerences in size, relative endowments,
and the level of trade costs and total world demand. The interested reader
is referred to Markusen (1997) for a fuller development.
Horizontal multinationals tend to arise when the two countries are simi-
lar in size and relative endowments, total demand is high, and trade costs
are moderate to high. In order to understand the importance of similarity
in size, it is perhaps easiest to note that single-plant ﬁrms (national or
vertical) have an inherent advantage when the countries are of very diﬀer-
ent size: Put a single plant in the large country, avoiding costly capacity in
the small market. Growth in total demand will induce shifts (in some re-
gions of parameter space) from single-plant production, serving the other
market by high marginal-cost exports, to high ﬁxed-cost branch plant pro-
duction.
Vertical multinationals are favored over national ﬁrms and horizontal
multinationals when the countries have very diﬀerent relative endowments,
especially when the skilled-labor-abundant country is also small. Diﬀer-
ences in factor prices encourage fragmentation of activities, such that the
headquarters in the skilled-labor-abundant country and diﬀerences in size
encourage placing the plant in the large country. These two motives re-
inforce one another when the skilled-labor-abundant country is also small.
These results are interesting, but not very useful to take to the data. We
do not have good data on the types of ﬁrms existing, and in reality, these
pure types are greatly blurred in any case. However, the model can be used
to generate results on the sales of aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms in country j.
This reduced form gives us direct predictions on observable data, fully
endogenizing the trade ﬂows, types of ﬁrms that are active, and so forth,
without requiring us to identify those items in the data.
Figures 3.1–3.4 present results from simulations using the model from
Markusen (1997) and Carr et al. (forthcoming). These diagrams are world
Edgeworth boxes, with unskilled labor on the x axis and skilled labor on
the y axis. The origin for country i is at the southwest (SW) corner and the
origin for country j is at the northeast (NE) corner. For points on the SW-
NE diagonal, the countries have the same relative endowments but diﬀer
in size. Note for later reference that movements within these Edgeworth
boxes are compensated experiments, in that total world factor endowments
are constant (and, therefore, world GDP is approximately constant). These
diagrams are most useful for developing intuition about two-way data in
which we observe production and sales by aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms in
country j and vice versa. Thus in any pair (i-to-j and j-to-i) of observations,
total GDP and factor endowments are held constant.
Aﬃliate sales are graphed on the vertical axis of ﬁgure 3.1. Aﬃliate sales
76 James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskusappear as a saddle, with an inverted U-shaped curve along the SW-NE
diagonal. As noted earlier, horizontal multinationals dominate production
when the countries are identical, whereas national ﬁrms located in the
larger country dominate when the countries are very diﬀerent in size. In
the center of the box, exactly half of world production is aﬃliate sales,
while the other half is the output of the horizontal multinationals’ domes-
tic plants.
The highest level of aﬃliate sales occurs in the NW and SE areas of the
Edgeworth box in ﬁgure 3.1, where one country is both small and skilled
labor abundant.1 In this case, most ﬁrms are vertical multinationals head-
quartered in the small, skilled-labor-abundant country, so most plants are
located in the larger, skilled-labor-scarce country. Output of these plants
is classiﬁed as “aﬃliate production,” of course, so most (in the limit, all)
world X production is aﬃliate sales.
Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show simulation results for aﬃliate sales in just
one direction: aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms producing in country j. Figure
3.2 shows the local sales in country j of aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms. There
is again an inverted U-shaped relationship along the SW-NE diagonal. But
1. The locus of points in which countries i and j have equal incomes is much steeper than
the NW-SE diagonal of the Edgeworth boxes in ﬁgures 3.1–3.4. It runs between columns 8
(north edge) and 12 (south edge). So, for example, country i is smaller than j to the left of
this locus.
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Fig. 3.1 World aﬃliate salesthe highest levels occur when country i is both small and skilled labor
abundant for the reasons just noted.
Figure 3.3 shows the export sales of aﬃliates back to the parent country
i. This diagram is a “mountain,” reaching a maximum when country i is
small and skilled labor abundant, but not too small and not too skilled
labor scarce. The not-too-small requirement is obvious, because little out-
put is exported back to a very small country. The not-too-skilled-labor-
abundant requirement is less obvious, and it has to do with the assumption
that some host-country skilled labor is required in plant-level ﬁxed costs.
As country j becomes too skilled labor scarce, production there becomes
very expensive and national ﬁrms in country j substitute for vertical ﬁrms
headquartered in i and producing in j.
There are clear diﬀerences between ﬁgures 3.2 and 3.3. Most notably,
only local sales occur if the countries are very similar, or if country i is
very small and very skilled labor abundant. Yet there are some similarities
that make it diﬃcult to propose sharply diﬀerent hypotheses regarding
how these two classes of aﬃliate sales should be related to country charac-
teristics.
Figure 3.4 clariﬁes this ambiguity a bit by displaying the ratio of aﬃliate
exports back to the parent to local aﬃliate sales in the host country. This
graph suggest that this ratio is most closely related to the skilled labor
abundance of the parent in relation to the host country. Relative size
78 James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskus
Fig. 3.2 Local sales of aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms in country jFig. 3.4 Ratio of export sales to local sales, aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms in
country j
Fig. 3.3 Export sales of aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms in country jdiﬀerences play some role, but the ratio clearly is not higher when the
parent country i is both small and skilled labor abundant.2
These simulation results suggest a number of independent variables that
should be used to explain the three dependent variables: local sales by
aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms in country j (ﬁg. 3.2), export sales by the same
aﬃliates (ﬁg. 3.3), and the ratio of these two variables (ﬁg. 3.4). Refer to
these variables as RSALESL, RSALESE, and RATIOEL (R for real in the
ﬁrst two). We now list the right-hand-side variables, adding a discussion of
the hypothesized signs and magnitudes using ﬁgures 3.1–3.4 and other
more obvious intuition. Again, note that these hypotheses are most appro-
priate to two-way compensated observations as noted earlier. We shall re-
turn to this point shortly.
SUMGDP denotes the sum of two countries’ real GDPs. This should
have a positive coeﬃcient in explaining RSALESL and RSALESE. How-
ever, the eﬀect should be stronger on RSALESL; the reason is that growth
will, at various points in parameter space, lead to a switch from high
marginal-cost single-plant ﬁrms to high ﬁxed-cost multiplant ﬁrms, in-
creasing local sales more than in proportion to growth in incomes. Accord-
ingly, we hypothesize that RATIOEL should be negatively related to
SUMGDP.
GDPDIFF is the diﬀerence between the two countries’ real GDP levels,
and GDPDIFSQ is the squared diﬀerence. GDPDIFSQ should be nega-
tively related to all three dependent variables, as suggested by ﬁgures 3.2–
3.4. Moving along various loci parallel to the SW-NE diagonal, all three
dependent variables are higher near the center than at the extremes, al-
though the maximum point generally is not exactly where the two coun-
tries are the same size.
SKDIFF denotes the relative skilled labor abundance of the parent
country relative to that of the host; formally, it is the share of the labor
force that is skilled in country i (parent or source) minus the same share in
country j (host). SKDIFF should be positively related to both RSALESL
and RSALESE. However, it is likely to have a stronger impact on
RSALESE than on RSALESL from examination of ﬁgures 3.2 and 3.3.
Relative endowments and factor price diﬀerences are the primary determi-
nants of export sales, whereas local sales are inﬂuenced heavily by country
sizes as well. Accordingly, we hypothesize that SKDIFF will have a posi-
tive sign in the RATIOEL regression, as suggested by ﬁgure 3.4.
INVJ denotes an index of investment barriers (costs) into country j, the
host country. Higher numbers indicate higher investment costs. This is hy-
pothesized to be negatively related to both RSALESL and RSALESE.
However, investments to serve the local market may be less sensitive to
2. Recall that country i is smaller than country j at all points left of a line running from
approximately column 8 on the north side of the box to column 12 on the south side.
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tive locations may be selected for the latter; thus we hypothesize that the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient in the RSALESL equation should be less than
that in the RSALESE equation, and therefore that the sign on INVJ
should be negative in the RATIOEL equation as well.
TCJ denotes an index of trade barriers (costs, not including distance or
freight) into country j. Higher numbers indicate higher barriers or costs.
Such barriers should encourage investments to serve the local market, so
the hypothesized sign is positive in the RSALESL equation. The eﬀect
should be noticeably less in the RSALESE equation and may be negative,
insofar as trade costs raise the costs of imported intermediate inputs. The
sign of the coeﬃcient in the RATIOEL equation should thus be negative.
TCI is a similar measure of trade barriers back into the parent country.
This has little eﬀect on production for local sales in country j, but is ex-
pected to have a negative eﬀect on production for export, insofar as much
of that may be going back to the home country. This variable should thus
have a negative sign in the RATIOEL equation.
SKDIFF*GDPDIFF is an interactive term. Referring to ﬁgures 3.2–
3.3, the eﬀect of an increase in SKDIFF should be larger when the parent
is smaller (GDPDIFF  0), and the eﬀect of an increase in GDPI (parent
GDP) should be smaller when the parent country i is skilled labor abun-
dant (SKDIFF  0). Both eﬀects imply that the sign of the coeﬃcient on
the interactive term should be negative in the RSALESL and RSALESE
regressions. Figure 3.4, however, does not suggest a very sharp hypothesis
as to whether it should be positive or negative in the RATIOEL equation.
Therefore, we are agnostic about the sign in the RATIOEL equation.
DIST will denote a distance measure between pairs of countries. Theory
does not oﬀer us much of a prediction about distance. It may lead to a
substitution: producing abroad instead of exporting to a distant country.
However, distance raises the transaction costs of investments as well as
those of exports. It is possible that distance might aﬀect production for
export more negatively than it would production for local sale (which
might actually be encouraged), but we are generally agnostic insofar as we
do not understand the transactions costs of investing at a long distance.
In addition to examining these hypotheses on two-way data (inward and
outward aﬃliate sales data for the United States), we examine them on
U.S. outward data only. The advantage of the latter is that it breaks down
aﬃliate export sales into sales back to the parent country and sales to third
countries. Sales back to the U.S. parent may be closely identiﬁed with
vertical investments such as foreign assembly plants. We should note, how-
ever, that the intuition generated by ﬁgures 3.1–3.4 may not always be
appropriate, insofar as these diagrams are compensated experiments hold-
ing the two-country total factor endowment constant. Thus an increase in
SKDIFF is an increase in the U.S. skilled labor abundance and a fall in
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outward data, an increase in SKDIFF is a fall in the host-country skilled
labor abundance holding the U.S. endowment constant. Similar comments
apply to GDPDIFF, and in the outward regressions we will use GDPJ
since it is only the latter variable that changes.
A problematic issue with the outward-only data arises from the fact that
the United States (the parent) is always far bigger than the host, although
not always skilled labor abundant relative to the host. This restricts obser-
vations to an area in the NE section of the Edgeworth boxes in ﬁgures
3.2–3.4, which is a considerable diﬃculty given the nonlinearity and non-
monotonicity of the theoretical predictions over the parameter space of
the Edgeworth box. For example, note that increases in SKDIFF could
lead to a fall in outward U.S. investment in this region (foreign plants are
replaced by U.S. national ﬁrms serving the host by exports). Thus we
should expect some diﬀerences in the U.S. outward-only results versus the
two-way results due to the fact that they are somewhat diﬀerent experi-
ments and because we are constrained to a subregion of parameter space
in the outward-only data. Further comment is postponed until we view
the results.
3.3 Data Sources and Variable Construction
The data form a panel of cross-country observations over the period
1986–94. We take real sales volume of nonbank manufacturing aﬃliates
in each country to indicate production activity. The U.S. Department of
Commerce provides annual data on sales of foreign aﬃliates of American
parent ﬁrms and on sales of U.S. aﬃliates of foreign parent ﬁrms. Thus,
for each year, the United States serves as both the headquarters country
for its ﬁrms producing abroad and the aﬃliate country for foreign ﬁrms
producing there. There are thirty-six countries in addition to the United
States for which we have at least one year of complete data. Annual sales
values abroad are converted into millions of 1990 U.S. dollars using an
exchange rate adjusted local wholesale price index, with exchange rates
and price indexes taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
of the International Monetary Fund.
As just noted, the inward data (U.S. aﬃliates of foreign parents) list only
total exports of the aﬃliates to all countries. The outward data (foreign
aﬃliates of U.S. parents) break down exports of those aﬃliates into exports
back to the United States and exports to third countries. The latter series
is particularly valuable, but constrains the analysis to a subarea of the
Edgeworth box in which the parent country (United States) is always very
large relative to the host, as has been noted. The inward-outward (two-
way) data are thus in some ways much better for examining the theory, but
suﬀer from a clear third-country problem, whereas the theory is developed
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a drawback: the inward-outward data using total aﬃliate export sales to
all countries, and outward-only data in which exports can be distinguished
between exports back to the parent and exports to third countries.
Real GDP is measured in billions of 1990 U.S. dollars for each country.
For this purpose, annual real GDP ﬁgures in local currencies were con-
verted into dollars using the market exchange rate. These data are also
from the IFS.
Skilled labor abundance is deﬁned as the sum of occupational categories
0/1 (professional, technical, and kindred workers) and 2 (administrative
workers) in employment in each country, divided by total employment.
These ﬁgures are compiled from annual surveys reported in the Yearbook
of Labour Statistics published by the International Labour Organization.
In cases in which some annual ﬁgures were missing, the skilled labor ratios
were taken to equal the period averages for each country. The variable
SKDIFF is then simply the diﬀerence between the relative skill endow-
ment of the parent country and that of the aﬃliate country.
T h ec o s to fi n v e s t i n gi nt h ea ﬃliate country is a simple average of several
indexes of impediments to investment throughout the period, reported in
the World Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum. The in-
dexes include restrictions on ability to acquire control in a domestic com-
pany, limitations on the ability to employ foreign skilled labor, restraints
on negotiating joint ventures, strict controls on hiring and ﬁring practices,
market dominance by a small number of enterprises, an absence of fair
administration of justice, diﬃculties in acquiring local bank credit, restric-
tions on access to local and foreign capital markets, and inadequate pro-
tection of intellectual property. These indexes are computed on a scale
from 0 to 100, with a higher number indicating higher investment costs.
A trade cost index is taken from the same source and is deﬁned as a
measure of national protectionism, or eﬀorts to prevent importation of
competitive products. It also runs from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the
highest trade costs. All of these indexes are based on extensive surveys of
multinational enterprises.
We also incorporate a measure of distance, which is simply the number
of kilometers of each country’s capital city from Washington, D.C. It is
unclear whether this variable captures trade costs or investment costs,
since both should rise with distance.
3.4 Results
Tables 3.1–3.3 show results for regression equations on the full inward-
outward data set. Table 3.1 gives results for dependent variable RSALESL
(local sales in country j of aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms). Signs are as pre-
dicted for direct eﬀects, although the two variables involving SKDIFF are
Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence 83not statistically signiﬁcant. Country size, investment costs, and trade costs
into the host-country market have strong explanatory power. Trade costs
back into the parent country (TCI) have little explanatory power, and the-
ory does not hypothesize that it should.
Table 3.2 gives results for dependent variable RSALESE (export sales
to all countries by aﬃliates of country i ﬁrms in country j). Signs are as
hypothesized except for TCI, which should be negative, at least for exports
going back to the home countries (these cannot be broken out in the data,
as previously noted). The two terms involving SKDIFF are both larger
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Table 3.1 Results for Panel Estimation, Inward and Outward Data




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
SUMGDP 10.2937 Yes 9.108 0.0001
GDPDIFSQ 0.0009 Yes 7.163 0.0001
SKDIFF 10,531 Yes 0.877 0.3813
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 2.6932 Yes 1.114 0.2658
INVCJ 633.3970 Yes 7.119 0.0001
TCJ 366.5574 Yes 6.142 0.0001
TCI 22.0996 ? 0.195 0.8451
DIST 1.5326 ? 9.293 0.0001
INTERCEPT 469.22 0.046 0.9631
Table 3.2 Results for Panel Estimation, Inward and Outward Data




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
SUMGDP 2.9274 Yes 3.971 0.0001
GDPDIFSQ 0.0003 Yes 3.504 0.0005
SKDIFF 42,961 Yes 5.523 0.0001
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 6.9520 Yes 4.434 0.0001
INVCJ 277.2284 Yes 4.758 0.0001
TCJ 52.1164 ? 1.332 0.1836
TCI 65.6274 No 0.892 0.3729
DIST 0.6398 ? 5.927 0.0001
INTERCEPT 7,501.94 1.127 0.2604in magnitude (economic signiﬁcance) than in the RSALESL regression,
and highly statistically signiﬁcant. The magnitude of the SUMGDP co-
eﬃcient, on the other hand, is much smaller in the RSALESE regression.
These results suggest that market size is a more important determinant of
production for local sales while diﬀerences in relative endowments are a
more important determinant of production for export.
These comparisons can be misleading, however, due to diﬀerences in
the size of the dependent variables (local sales are larger than export sales
in most observations). Table 3.3 therefore uses the ratio of export sales to
local sales. Results conﬁrm that market size is more important for local
sales (coeﬃcient on SUMGDP is negative) and that skill diﬀerences are
more important for export sales (coeﬃcient on SKDIFF is positive); thus,
the proportion of export sales increases as host country j becomes more
unskilled labor abundant (skilled labor scarce).
The coeﬃcients on the INVCJ and TCJ variables in the ratio equation of
table 3.3 are negative. This conforms to our intuition about substitutability.
Production for local sale, by deﬁnition, cannot move to a third country,
and thus local sales may be relatively insensitive to these costs. Production
for export sale may be more sensitive to investment and trade costs be-
cause the ﬁrm can choose an alternative location to serve a broader mar-
ket, as suggested by the negative signs in the ratio equation. TCI is positive
in this regression, which is consistent with results in tables 3.1 and 3.2.
This outcome is not consistent with our intuition, but note that the signiﬁ-
cance level is low. Higher parent-country trade costs should discourage
foreign production for export back to the parent, but should not aﬀect
production for local sale.
Tables 3.4–3.8 present results on the U.S. outward-only sample, allowing
Table 3.3 Results for Panel Estimation, Inward and Outward Data




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
SUMGDP 0.000671 Yes 4.327 0.0001
GDPDIFSQ 1.92E-08 Yes 1.209 0.2273
SKDIFF 3.175373 Yes 3.121 0.0019
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 0.000043 ? 0.173 0.8630
INVCJ 0.043374 Yes 3.491 0.0005
TCJ 0.010975 Yes 1.261 0.2082
TCI 0.014789 No 1.094 0.2749
DIST 0.000055 ? 2.446 0.0149
INTERCEPT 6.100586 4.222 0.0001
Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence 85a breakdown of production for export sale into sales back to the United
States (RSALESUS in table 3.5) and sales to third countries (RSALESF
in table 3.6). The most dramatic change in these results relative to tables
3.1–3.3 is the reversal in the signs of SKDIFF and GDPDIFF*SKDIFF.
This suggests that U.S. outward investment is attracted to more-skilled-
labor-abundant countries, for both local production and production for
export, with strong statistical signiﬁcance. The latter result is particularly
at odds with the two-way results.
There are two possible explanations, other than simply concluding that
inward and outward investments follow diﬀerent models. First, there is the
compensated versus uncompensated issue that we mentioned earlier. In
the U.S. outward-only data, an increase in SKDIFF holds U.S. skilled
labor abundance constant, eﬀectively lowering world skilled labor abun-
dance. This is a somewhat diﬀerent experiment than that in the two-way
data, which includes not only such uncompensated observations across
diﬀerent countries, but also a great many compensated observation pairs
comparing i-to-j and j-to-i aﬃliate production. The response of aﬃliate
production to an increase in host-country skilled labor abundance (de-
crease in SKDIFF) should be more positive or less negative than if this
change is accompanied by a fall in the parent-country skilled labor abun-
dance, and that is what the results are telling us.
The second possible explanation relates to the fact that the parent coun-
try (the United States) is always much larger than the host in the U.S.
outward data. How this might aﬀect the results is shown most clearly in
ﬁgure 3.2. When country i is quite large relative to country j, a (compen-
sated) increase in SKDIFF may produce a fall in RSALESL: Heading
toward the north edge of the box, we go over the “hump” and RSALESL
Table 3.4 Results for Panel Estimation, U.S. Outward Only




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
GDPJ 20.8423 Yes 10.362 0.0001
GDPDIFSQ 0.0018 Yes 8.120 0.0001
SKDIFF 948,636 ? 11.980 0.0001
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 174.5818 ? 11.905 0.0001
INVCJ 517.8056 Yes 6.546 0.0001
TCJ 314.8092 Yes 5.943 0.0001
DIST 1.2044 ? 7.810 0.0001
INTERCEPT 73,798.00 9.863 0.0001
86 James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskusstart to fall. What is happening in the theory model is that host country j
is becoming suﬃciently skilled labor scarce that branch plants there are
closed and production is concentrated in national ﬁrms headquartered in
country i. This implies a negative sign on SKDIFF, which is the result we
are getting in tables 3.4–3.6. This ﬁnding is in fact consistent with results
in Zhang and Markusen (1999), which show that the smallest, poorest
(skilled-labor-scarce) countries receive a far smaller share of world direct
investment than their share of income. The result and associated theory
also points out the importance of knowing which part of the box is being
Table 3.6 Results for Panel Estimation, U.S. Outward Only




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
GDPJ 6.8947 Yes 5.690 0.0001
GDPDIFSQ 0.0006 Yes 4.615 0.0001
SKDIFF 237,383 No 4.803 0.0001
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 44.7907 ? 4.860 0.0001
INVCJ 211.3208 Yes 4.541 0.0001
TCJ 8.6449 Yes 0.279 0.7805
DIST 8.6449 ? 3.001 0.0030
INTERCEPT 29,941.00 6.715 0.0001
Table 3.5 Results for Panel Estimation, U.S. Outward Only




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
GDPJ 2.1956 Yes 1.445 0.1499
GDPDIFSQ 0.0002 Yes 1.332 0.1843
SKDIFF 177,143 No 3.049 0.0026
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 33.4368 ? 3.088 0.0023
INVCJ 346.6351 Yes 5.722 0.0001
TCJ 207.5793 No 5.141 0.0001
DIST 0.7968 ? 6.635 0.0001
INTERCEPT 20,469 3.616 0.0004
Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence 87examined and of adding more investing countries, as is done in the two-
way sample.
Table 3.7 shows results for the ratio of aﬃliate export sales back to the
United States to aﬃliate sales to the local market, and table 3.8 shows
results for the ratio of aﬃliate sales to third markets to aﬃliate sales to the
local market. Results on market size conﬁrm those in table 3.3, that a
larger market shifts a proportion of sales from exports to local sales. The
ﬁndings also conﬁrm the results on INVCJ and TCJ (TCI was dropped
because country i is always the United States). The results on SKDIFF
and GDPDIFF*SKDIFF are not consistent with tables 3.4–3.6; however,
Table 3.7 Results for Panel Estimation, U.S. Outward Only




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
GDPJ 0.000693 Yes 3.708 0.0003
GDPDIFSQ 4.12E-08 Yes 2.134 0.0340
SKDIFF 2.364984 Yes 0.391 0.6963
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 0.000186 ? 0.165 0.8689
INVCJ 0.019319 Yes 2.831 0.0051
TCJ 0.004806 Yes 0.959 0.3387
DIST 0.000087 ? 6.225 0.0001
INTERCEPT 1.947083 2.925 0.0038
Table 3.8 Results for Panel Estimation, U.S. Outward Only




Parameter Sign as T for HO:
Variable Estimate Predicted? Parm  0 Prob  |T|
GDPJ 0.001291 Yes 3.881 0.0001
GDPDIFSQ 2.36E-08 Yes 0.683 0.4953
SKDIFF 29.904477 Yes 2.630 0.0091
GDPDIFF*SKDIFF 0.005218 ? 2.467 0.0144
INVCJ 0.045391 Yes 3.517 0.0005
TCJ 0.003751 Yes 0.403 0.6876
DIST 0.000026 ? 0.841 0.4014
INTERCEPT 3.913419 3.330 0.0010
88 James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskusthese point estimates have extremely low statistical signiﬁcance in table
3.7, while the positive sign on SKDIFF in table 3.3 is highly signiﬁcant.
Both coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant in table 3.8. Thus, the results
suggest that U.S. outward investment is not attracted to low-skilled coun-
tries, even investment for production for export back to the United States
(table 3.5).
Results on market size and relative endowments must be interpreted
carefully, however, since GDP appears in three terms and relative endow-
ments in two terms. Let us write the ﬁrst four terms of the regression
equations as










The derivatives of this equation with respect to host-country variables
GDPJ and SKLJ are then as follows (an increase in GDPJ is a negative
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Table 3.9 computes values of these derivatives at the mean values of
SKDIFF and GDPDIFF for the two samples. Table 3.9 gives the absolute
change in sales by country i aﬃliates in j in response to a growth in country
j’s income and to an increase in country j’s skilled labor abundance (de-
crease in its unskilled labor abundance). Eﬀects of increases in country j’s
investment and trade cost indexes are also listed. The top panel gives re-
sults for the inward-outward estimation, while the lower panel gives esti-
mates for the U.S. outward estimation only. Below the level estimates, an
elasticity ﬁgure is computed. We do not compute elasticities with respect
to INVCJ and TCJ, since these are qualitative indexes.
According to results in the top panel of table 3.9, local sales are elastic
with respect to host-country income, with an elasticity of ε  1.6. Export
sales are less elastic, at ε  1.1. Local sales are very insensitive to the
skilled labor ratio in the host country, while export sales have an elasticity
with respect to the skilled labor ratio of ε  0.7. Production for export
sales is attracted to less-skilled-labor-abundant (more-skilled-labor-scarce)
countries. Comparing local sales to export sales, the former respond more
to income, whereas the latter respond more to skilled labor scarcity as
suggested by the regression results discussed earlier.
The pattern for the U.S. outward-only data (lower panel of table 3.9) is
qualitativelysimilartothetoppanelbutquantitativelydiﬀerent.Production







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.for local sale has an elasticity with respect to local market size of about 1.0,
while the elasticities of exports back to the United States and to third
countries are 0.2 and 1.0, respectively. A weighted average of these two
elasticities (εw) yields a ﬁgure of 0.68. Thus the elasticity of exports with
respect to host-country size is less than that for local sales by an amount
similar to the two-way estimates. The elasticity of local sales with respect
to the host-country skilled labor ratio is about 0.6, while the average of the
two export elasticities is 0.06. Production for export back to the United
States or to third countries is insensitive to the host-country skilled labor
ratio, at least at the mean of GDPDIFF. Again, the pattern is qualitatively
similar to that for the two-way estimate in that the export elasticity with
respect to local skilled labor is smaller than that for local sales (i.e., less
positive or more negative).
Overall, the results in table 3.9, taking into account interactive eﬀects,
clearly conﬁrm that production for local sales is more sensitive to local
market size than is production for export. Production for local sales has
an elasticity with respect to the host-country skilled labor ratio that is
larger than the elasticity for production for export. Production shifts rela-
tively in favor of local sales when the host is more skilled labor abundant
and relatively in favor of exports when the host is skilled labor scarce.
There is an interesting quantitative diﬀerence between the two-way and
U.S. outward estimates of the elasticities with respect to the host-country
skilled labor ratio (subject again to the caveats that these are point esti-
mates, evaluated at the mean of GDPDIFF in each sample, and that the
means diﬀer in the two samples). While production for export is attracted
by host-country unskilled labor abundance in the two-way sample, there
is virtually no eﬀect in the U.S. outward sample. We might infer from this
that production by U.S. aﬃliates for export, including that back to the
United States, is not primarily attracted to low-skilled countries, contrary
toa popularimpression ofmultinationals exportingjobs tolow-wage coun-
tries. While this may occur in arm’s-length outsourcing (e.g., subcon-
tracting), our results suggest that it is not primarily multinationals that are
responsible for such a phenomenon. As we have noted, this is consistent
with the theoretical assumption that branch-plant production is skilled
labor intensive relative to the rest of the host economy. Past a certain level
of skilled labor scarcity in the host economy, inward direct investment
begins to fall as that country becomes increasingly skilled labor scarce
(Zhang and Markusen 1999).
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
Robert Lipsey’s work over many years has given us a rich empirical
literature that relates the behavior of multinational ﬁrms to industry and
country characteristics. Theoretical work that endogenizes multinational
Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence 91ﬁrms into general equilibrium trade models has developed somewhat more
recently, and oﬀers predictions about the relationship between aﬃliate pro-
duction and parent-country and host-country characteristics. In particu-
lar, the knowledge-capital approach to the multinational enterprise iden-
tiﬁes motives for both horizontal and vertical multinational activity and
predicts how aﬃliate activity should be related to variables such as country
sizes and relative endowment diﬀerences.
This paper draws implications from the theory as to how production for
local sales versus production for export sales relates to country characteris-
tics, and then subjects these hypotheses to empirical estimation. Results
ﬁt well with the theory in terms of economic and statistical signiﬁcance.
Local (host-country) market size is more important for production for lo-
cal sales than for production for export sales. Host-country skilled labor
scarcity is important for export production relative to production for local
sales. Investment and trade-cost barriers in the host country aﬀect produc-
tion for export more negatively than they do production for local sales.
Some quantitative diﬀerence was found in the two-way (inward and out-
ward) sample versus the U.S. outward-only sample with respect to host-
country skilled labor scarcity. In the U.S. outward-only sample, host-
country skilled labor scarcity (unskilled labor abundance) had little eﬀect
on U.S. aﬃliate production for export sale, whether back to the United
States or to third countries. This suggests that U.S. outward investment is
not drawn primarily to unskilled-labor-abundant countries, contrary to a
common fear that outsourcing by multinationals is resulting in a loss of
U.S. unskilled jobs. (Firms could, of course, be outsourcing to unaﬃliated
subcontractors). In the two-way sample, production for exports is drawn to
unskilled-labor-abundant countries. However, the results are qualitatively
similar in the two samples insofar as unskilled labor abundance in the host
is relatively more important for export sales.
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Comment Ann E. Harrison
I’d like to begin by saying how much I welcome the opportunity to contrib-
ute to this conference in honor of Robert Lipsey. One of my greatest joys
in being aﬃliated with the NBER (and there have been many) has been
the opportunity to get to know him. One outcome has been a recent pa-
per that we coauthored on the impact of multinational activity on host-
country wages, where we found that multinational corporations (MNCs)
pay a wage premium vis-a `-vis domestic enterprises equal to around 10 per-
cent (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey 1997).
It is also a great pleasure to be able to discuss Jim Markusen and Keith
Maskus’s paper. This paper is very appropriate for the conference: The
authors are applying some very interesting ideas to real data.
Let me begin by highlighting two reasons this is timely: (1) It provides
a concise but illuminating review of the previous literature on direct invest-
ment and multinational activity, focusing in particular on Bob Lipsey’s
voluminous contributions to that literature. (2) It provides a nice review of
some of Jim Markusen’s research, focusing on some of his key ideas and
presenting graphical representations of his theoretical results.
This paper measures the importance of two diﬀerent motives for multi-
national activity: exploiting diﬀerences in endowments (which leads to ver-
tical MNC activity, with skill-intensive activities such as R&D done at
home, and labor-intensive activities such as assembly done abroad) versus
exploiting certain ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets or ideas that can be shared across
units. The latter motive for MNCs is likely to lead ﬁrms to establish similar
units across countries, leading to horizontal FDI. The question is, How
can we distinguish between these two motives in the data?
The authors are able to identify empirically the importance of these two
motives through clever use of U.S. data on inward and outward MNC
activity: MNCs that locate facilities abroad for reexport are likely to be
doing so in order to take advantage of diﬀerences in factor endowments.
Take, for example, maquiladoras in northern Mexico who exploit cheap
labor and reexport all their ﬁnal production back to the United States.
MNCs who expand horizontally and set up similar facilities at home and
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tiple facilities) and are less sensitive to diﬀerences in endowments.
Another attractive feature of this paper is that it is the only research of
which I am aware that directly tests the implications of general equilibrium
models of FDI on actual data. Clearly, this research agenda could provide
much scope for future papers. I have several suggestions for future re-
search.
First, it is easy to understand the motive for a vertical MNC and how
to identify the motive empirically: MNC activity should be correlated with
diﬀe r e n c e si ne n d o w m e n t s .Ih a v ead i ﬃcult time, however, trying to un-
derstand how we test for the alternative hypothesis: How do we capture
the horizontal motive empirically? Based on the theory, the authors argue
that horizontal MNC activity is more likely between countries of similar
size with similar endowments. It is diﬃcult for me to understand why there
should be any MNC activity at all in this case—why don’t countries just
trade? The answer must be that high tariﬀs or transport costs make it
diﬃcult to trade and therefore lead to horizontal MNC. So I ﬁnd the au-
thors’ results on protection a better measure of the importance of hori-
zontal MNC activity than the variable that they use (GDP size) to provide
support for horizontal MNC activity. I suspect that GDP size is important
because it reﬂects opportunities to take advantage of protected domestic
markets, rather than scale-induced horizontal expansion. One nice empiri-
cal result in the paper is that tariﬀ-jumping is clearly a motive for hori-
zontal MNC activity but not for vertical MNC activity.
Another reason for horizontal MNC activity could be market imperfec-
tions that make it diﬃcult to exploit intangible assets through arm’s-length
licensing, such as poor contract enforcement. This is the so-called internal-
ization hypothesis, which can be captured through variables such as R&D-
to-sales ratios. The authors do include measures of protection and trans-
port costs, but not measures of R&D intensity.
This brings me to my next point: In future research, it would be interest-
ing to compare the results in the current paper with results using disaggre-
gated manufacturing data. The authors have made excellent use of coun-
try-level data on MNC activity both into and out of the United States, but
my intuition tells me that the motive for MNC activity within a country
will vary quite a bit by subsector. Let’s take, for example, the sales of U.S.
aﬃliates in Mexico:
At the border, U.S. maquiladoras are assembling garments for reexport to
the United States. This is clearly based on diﬀerences in endowments
and is of the vertical MNC type.
The big three U.S. auto makers, at least before NAFTA, were completely
driven to produce in Mexico because of prohibitive tariﬀs and quotas.
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only at the end of the sample period.
Colgate Palmolive has a huge operation in Mexico. This seems to be based
on the desire to exploit ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets by relocating there. This is
horizontal MNC activity based on intangible assets and correlated with
home R&D intensity.
If we add all three types of aﬃliate sales together for the empirical work,
my fear is that these diﬀerent eﬀects become muddled and it becomes
very diﬃcult to distinguish between the diﬀerent motives for foreign direct
investment. The aggregation problem could explain why it is diﬃcult to
get consistent results across diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The variable SKLDIF
in some cases captures endowment diﬀerences, and in other cases captures
the fact that there is less direct investment between less similar countries
(i.e., we get horizontal FDI).
I have some other, minor, comments. In the real world, there are more
than two factors. How do the authors account for natural-resource inten-
sive reasons for moving? Why do the authors use weighted least squares?
It would also be useful to know the weights used in the estimation. Since
the authors have a panel over time and across countries, they could also
try using a ﬁxed-eﬀects approach. I wonder how the importance of ex-
change rate ﬂuctuations are taken into account. A large share of Japanese
MNC activity into the United States was driven by the desire to hedge
against a strong yen and a ﬂuctuating exchange rate. Do the authors in-
clude time dummies to account for this?
The authors use a cost-of-investing index, which measures the barriers
to FDI and is consistently negatively correlated with aﬃliate activity. This
index includes a lot of independent factors such as restrictions on major-
ity controls, labor market restrictions on hiring and ﬁring, entry barriers
throughexistingoligopolies,andinadequateprotectionofintellectualprop-
erty. It would be very interesting to be able to measure the independent
eﬀects of these separate policies. This again would be easier to do with
more disaggregate data, which would increase sample size and allow the
authors to add more right-hand-size variables.
Let me conclude by saying how much I have enjoyed reading and think-
ing about the results in this paper.
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